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It is a paradox of history that Britain’s declaration of war on Germany in 
August 1914 probably averted a civil war in Ireland. 1  In the mainly 
Protestant north-eastern counties 85,000 men of the protestant Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF) an armed paramilitary force was committed to resist 
the imposition of a Home Rule parliament on the nine counties of Ulster. 
Trained, equipped and organised on a military basis the UVF had been 
formed in 1913 to enable the unionist leadership to co-ordinate and control 
a number of independent groups training throughout the Province. 2 
Opposing this force was the larger but less well organised and equipped 
Irish National Volunteers. Together these armed paramilitary militias 
outnumbered the total strength of the British regular army stationed in the 
United Kingdom. In the view of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and 
his colleagues, if ‘these two large forces should come into conflict (…) [it] 
may require the whole of our available forces at home to deal with’.3 This 
crisis had largely been brought about by the Liberal Party’s need for the 
support of the Irish Parliamentary Party to remain in government and the 
price of that support was Home Rule for Ireland.4 
Two previous attempts to grant Home Rule to Ireland had failed to 
obtain sufficient support in both chambers of parliament, but the last 
legislative impediment to its implementation, the House of Lords veto, had 
been removed by the Parliament Act 1911. The unionist response was to 
adopt unconstitutional methods to ensure their exclusion from governance 
by a Home Rule parliament. They were even threatening to establish a 
secessionist government in Ulster.5 The third Home Rule Bill was introduced 
by the Liberal government in the House of Commons on 11 April 1912 and, 
without the Lords’ veto, it would become law in 1914. To demonstrate the 
extent of their opposition, unionists organised the signing of a mass petition 
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on 28 September 1914 to which signatories pledged themselves to employ 
‘all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to 
set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland’. Committing themselves ‘to 
stand by one another in defending for ourselves and our children our 
cherished position of equal citizenship in the United Kingdom, and in using 
all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to 
set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland’, this Ulster Covenant was signed 
by 471,414 Ulstermen and women.6  
 
 
A drift towards military confrontation 
 
In January 1913, in recognition that numerous Orange lodges and Ulster 
clubs were already in military training, the Ulster Unionist Council decided 
to unite these disparate groups into a single body to be known as the UVF. 
Membership of this organization was to be limited to 100,000 men between 
the ages of 17 and 65 who had signed the Ulster Covenant. As a citizen 
army containing members from every strata of Ulster unionist society, the 
UVF were organised along similar lines to the British army in which many 
of its senior officers had served. Commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir 
George Richardson, late of the Indian army, by the time recruitment closed 
at the end of February 1914, almost 90,000 men had enrolled in UVF 
battalions, with thousands more enrolled in ancillary units such as the UVF 
Motor Car Corps and Ulster Signaling and Dispatch Rider Corps.7 Women 
played an important role in support of the Ulster Volunteers, not only as 
nurses but also, over a year before the Great War, as motorcycle dispatch 
riders, signallers, cipher-clerks and ambulance drivers.8 
It was not until November 1913 that nationalists responded to the 
formation of the UVF by the creation of their own paramilitary militia to 
ensure the implementation of Home Rule. On 1 November, an article 
entitled ‘The North Began’ written by Eoin MacNeill, a professor at 
University College Dublin, appeared in An Claidheamh Soluis, the newspaper 
of the Gaelic League, ‘threw down the gauntlet to nationalists to follow the 
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lead given by Ulster unionists’.9 The driving force behind the formation of 
the Volunteers was not the constitutional nationalists of Redmond’s Irish 
Parliamentary Party but the militant Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB).10 
On 11 November 11 prominent nationalists, including Sean MacDermott 
and Eamonn Ceannt, both members of the IRB and destined to be 
executed for their part in the 1916 Easter Rising, met at a Dublin hotel to 
discuss its formation.11 By the outbreak of the Great War membership of 
the Irish Volunteers had increased to 188,000.12 
On 14 March 1914, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Paget, the 
Commander in Chief in Ireland, was warned by the War Office that reports 
had been received that ‘evil-disposed persons’ intended to raid government 
arms and ammunition stores in various parts of Ireland.13 Because the arms 
and ammunition stores named in the letter were all in Ulster, Paget could 
have been in no doubt who these unnamed ‘evil-disposed persons’ were. 
Paget was instructed ‘to take all proper and necessary precautions for 
safeguarding Government property and maintaining law and order, in view 
of the special circumstances of the present time.’14 On the same day the 
Home Secretary, Winston Churchill, in a bellicose speech at Huddersfield, 
declared ‘that bloodshed no doubt was lamentable, but there were worse 
things than bloodshed, even on an extensive scale (…) Let us go forward 
together and put these grave matters to the proof’.15 It appears therefore, 
that certain elements within the Government were not adverse to the idea 
of provoking a confrontation with the Ulster Unionists. Sir John Seely, the 
Secretary of State for War, would later claim that a unionist coup was 
imminent in Ulster, although no evidence to support this claim survives.16. 
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On 18 March 1914, Paget attended a Cabinet committee meeting in London 
chaired by the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, at which it was decided to 
move additional troops into Ulster.17 The meeting resumed the next day 
without the Prime Minister and reassured that he would have whatever 
military support he required, Paget returned to Dublin to brief his senior 
officers. Before leaving however, Paget had been instructed by Sealy that 
officers who refused to follow orders to act in support of the civil powers, 
should not be allowed to resign but were to be dismissed from the service, 
although if officers with homes in Ulster requested not to take part in such 
an operation, they might be allowed to absent themselves from duty.18 
Churchill meanwhile gave orders for two light cruisers to embark a 
company of infantry from Kingstown and proceed to Belfast Lough, where 
they were to reinforce the troops guarding the ammunition and stores in 
Carrickfergus Castle, and to assist in its defence by use of naval guns if the 
necessity arose.19 The Third Battle Squadron was also ordered to proceed to 
Lamlash on the west coast of Scotland where it was to be joined by eight 
destroyers from the Home Fleet.20 As A.T.Q. Stewart observed in The Ulster 
Crisis ‘these preparations suggested an operation far more ambitious than 
the mere safe-guarding of depots against the UVF or other “evil-disposed 
persons”’.21 
On 20 March, Paget met with his senior officers to outline the 
outcome of his meeting in London. Believing that they were being asked to 
suppress opposition to Home Rule in Ulster Brigadier-General Hubert 
Gough and 60 officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade indicated that they 
preferred to accept dismissal if ordered north.22 Although this incident has 
come to be known as the ‘Curragh mutiny’ technically no mutiny took place 
as no orders had actually been given. Summoned to the War Office, Gough 
later confirmed that if a direct order had been given to move against Ulster 
he would have obeyed. Informing the King that Paget had exceeded his 
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orders Asquith’s government backed down, claiming that the events at the 
Curragh had arisen from ‘an honest misunderstanding’.23 Gough however, 
requested a written ‘assurance that we shall not be asked again to enforce on 
Ulster the present Home Rule Bill’.24 Realising that the written assurance he 
had obtained from Asquith fell short of Gough’s requirements, Seely added 
two paragraphs which stated that while the Government had the right to 
use ‘the forces of the Crown in Ireland or elsewhere to maintain law and 
order (…) they had no intention whatsoever of taking advantage of this 
right to crush political opposition to the policy or principles of the Home 
Rule Bill’. 25  Gough, however, seeking further clarification wrote ‘I 
understand the reading of the last paragraph to be that troops under our 
command will not be called upon to enforce the present Home Rule Bill on 
Ulster, and that we can so assure our officers’ – to which Sir John French, 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, appended the words ‘This is how I read 
it’.26 The government, however, repudiated the guarantee given to Gough 
stating that those involved had no right to amend the original document, 
and as a result, Seely, French and the Adjutant-General Sir John Ewart were 
forced to resign.27 Nevertheless, on 27 March, a Special Army Order was 
issued by the Army Council stating that ‘No officer or soldier shall in future 
be questioned by his superior officer as to the attitude he will adopt, or as to 
his action, in the event of his being required to obey orders dependent upon 
future or hypothetical contingencies’.28 
 Throughout 1913 the UVF had made numerous attempts to smuggle 
weapons and ammunition into Ulster with varying degrees of success. 29 
Such uncoordinated operations, however, were unlikely to meet the needs 
of an army of over 90,000 men. On 26 February 1914, Fred Crawford, a 
former British artillery officer, agreed to purchase 20,000 rifles and 
2,000,000 rounds of ammunition from Bruno Spiro, a German arms 
dealer.30 To cover the landing of the arms, a test mobilisation of the UVF 
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was held throughout the province on 24 April, during which control was 
taken of the port of Larne, where the guns were to be landed. As a decoy 
the SS Balmerino sailed into Belfast where it was met by 500 members of the 
Ulster Volunteers, which attracted the attention of a large force of police 
and Customs officers anxious to examine its cargo.  
 At Larne, all access to the town was cut, including telephone and 
telegraph links, while 500 motor vehicles assembled to distribute the 
expected cargo.31 No attempt by the police was made to interfere. At 10.30 
p.m. the SS Clydevalley, renamed Mountjoy for the occasion, entered the 
harbour where 11,000 rifles, each with 100 rounds of ammunition were 
landed and transferred to the waiting vehicles. Further bundles of weapons 
were offloaded onto smaller ships for transportation to Belfast and 
Donaghadee on the southern shore of Belfast Lough. By 2.30 a.m. all the 
weapons and ammunition on the Clydevalley had been unloaded, with the 
exception of those intended for Bangor, where the ship was to recoal and 
water.  
As at Larne, local UVF units had taken over the town of Bangor, 
situated 15 miles from Belfast but only six from a major army barracks at 
Holywood. The late arrival of the Clydevalley at Larne delayed its arrival in 
Bangor to 4.15 a.m., nevertheless, Colonel T.V.P. McCammon commanding 
the Ulster Volunteers assigned to unload the ship was able to report at 6.12 
a.m. that 40 tons of munitions had been unloaded and that the refueled 
Clydevalley had sailed. 32  At 7.20 a.m. the last of the motor vehicles 
transporting the weapons left Bangor and the operation was complete.33 At 
dawn on 25 April Customs officers were finally granted access to the 
Balmerino’s cargo which was found to be, as its manifest stated, coal. Except 
for a coastguard who died of a heart attack caused by overexertion no 
casualties occurred.34 
The nationalist response to the Larne gun running was to organise 
a similar shipment of arms for the Irish Volunteers. At the end of May 
Erskine Childers, the author of the novel The Riddle of the Sands and a British 
civil servant, accompanied by Darrell Figgis, purchased 1,500 Mauser 
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M1871 11 mm calibre single shot rifles and 49,000 rounds of ammunition 
from the Hamburg arms firm of Moritz Magnus der Jüngere. In order to 
purchase the weapons, Childers had informed the arms dealer that their 
final destination was Mexico and to cover their real destination 
arrangements were made for delivery of the consignment to be taken at sea. 
On 12 July 1914 a German vessel rendezvoused with Childers’ yacht Asgard 
and another yacht the Kelpie off the mouth of the Schelt estuary, where 900 
rifles and 29,000 rounds of ammunition were transferred to the Asgard and 
the remainder to the smaller 26 ton ketch, Kelpie. 
Unlike the Ulster Volunteers, whose operation was undertaken at 
night and with a degree of subterfuge to mislead the authorities, the landing 
of the weapons from the Asgard was undertaken in daylight and close to the 
centre of British administration in Dublin Castle.35 Shortly after noon on 26 
July, Childers sailed the Asgard into Howth harbour where its cargo was 
unloaded by uniformed members of the Irish Volunteers and boys of Na 
Fianna Éireann. 36  The Fianna was a youth organization established to 
provide its members with military training and instruction in nationalist 
ideology.37 Although Childers had, given the funds available, envisaged the 
gun running as a symbolic response to the UVF’s much larger operation in 
April, the leadership of the Irish Volunteers sought to use the undertaking 
as a propaganda coup, hence the number of Irish Volunteers present with 
the intention of marching armed through Dublin.38 The landing, as intended, 
had not gone unnoticed and the Harbour Master at Howth informed the 
authorities at Dublin Castle of the situation, who dispatched a contingent of 
the Dublin Metropolitan Police commanded by Assistant Commissioner 
William Harrell to disarm the Volunteers. Reinforced by a company of the 
King’s Own Scottish Borderers (KOSB) Harrell attempted to negotiate the 
peaceful seizure of the weapons but during the negotiations the Volunteers 
managed to spirit the arms away. Whilst returning to their barracks, 
however, the troops encountered a hostile, but unarmed crowd. At 
Bachelor’s Walk, Dublin, the Borderers were stoned by a crowd on whom 
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the soldiers opened fire killing three people and wounding a further 38.39 
The arms carried by the Kelpie were landed at night without incident at 
Kilcoole, south of Dublin, on 1 August.40 
 
 
Ireland’s influence on British foreign policy 
 
The potential impact of the situation prevailing in Ireland in 1914 should 
not be evaluated solely in the context of either Ireland or the United 
Kingdom. In 1912, the German Embassy in London reported to Berlin that 
the re-emergence of the Home Rule issue ‘would weaken England as a 
world power because of the influence the Irish exercise in America’. While 
in November 1913 it was the opinion of the Embassy that ‘so long as 
Ireland is in the foreground of internal policy, England’s parties will be 
compelled to manage their foreign policy cautiously and with discretion’.41 
It is apparent therefore that as early as 1912 Germany viewed the Irish 
situation in terms of its own possible advantage. 
 The destabilising effect of the Irish situation also concerned some 
members of the British establishment. Arthur Nicolson, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, expressed his exasperation on the 
Government’s partisan policy on Irish Home Rule in a letter to Sir Louis 
Mallet, the British Ambassador to Constantinople:  
 
I cannot find words strong enough to express my opinion of the 
conduct and attitude of the Government. What distresses me is the 
pitiable exhibition which we are presenting to foreign powers and 
the fact that it must before long seriously affect our position in 
Europe.42 
  
Some astute politicians, in both the Lords and the Commons, saw the 
impact of the Ulster Crisis on Europe and the encouragement it might give 
to Germany. Austen Chamberlain became convinced after a visit to Europe 
‘that British domestic difficulties were encouraging Germany in her policy 
of aggression’. 43  A view with which Lord Cromer, the former High 
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Commissioner to Egypt, concurred when he wrote to his friend Lord 
Milner, a firm supporter of the Ulster cause, informing him that ‘The 
Germans are always on the look-out with a view to taking advantage of any 
dissensions which may occur in this Country.’44 
Britain’s preoccupation with Ireland was also obvious to its allies. 
On the eve of war, Baron Beyens, the Belgian Ambassador to Germany, 
informed his government that as far as the Germans were concerned Britain 
was ‘paralysed by internal dissensions and her Irish quarrels’.45 In Paris too 
there was concern that the situation in Ireland was drawing the British army 
away from its commitment to support France in the event of a German 
invasion through Belgium. On 20 July 1911 Brigadier-General Henry 
Wilson, Director of Military Operations, had agreed with General Auguste 
Dubail, Chief of Staff at the French Ministry of War, that in the event of 
British intervention on the continent, an expeditionary force of six infantry 
divisions and a cavalry division would be landed in France between the 
forth and twelfth day of mobilisation.46 Although deeply involved in the 
‘Curragh mutiny’ Wilson was still capable of seeing the greater picture and 
rushed to Paris to reassure the French military authorities that the British 
army’s commitment to his agreement with Dubail was unimpaired.47 French 
concerns, however, were not without some foundation for on 4 July 1914, 
even before the landing of rifles for the Irish volunteers at Howth, Sir 
Charles Douglas, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, informed the Army 
Council that: 
 
If the whole of our Expeditionary Force were used in Ireland and to 
maintain order in Great Britain we should be quite incapable of 
meeting our obligations abroad, and in this connection India and 
Egypt must be specifically borne in mind. It seems to us at least 
possible that unrest in India and Egypt may follow the 
commencement of such operations, whilst certain countries in 
Europe may take this opportunity of creating trouble.48 
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The final word on the impact of the Irish situation in terms of the events 
being played out in Europe during July and August 1914 can best be left to 
the British wartime Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, who writing of 
the period in retrospect claimed: 
 
The long drawn-out and wearisome tragedy of the relations between 
Great Britain and Ireland played an important part in the World War. 
There can be little doubt that the expectation on the Continent that 
Britain had for the moment sunk so deep in the quagmires of the 
Irish bog as to be unable to extricate her feet in time to march 
eastward, was one of the considerations which encouraged Germany 




The coming of war: unionists and constitutional nationalism unite 
 
As war in Europe approached both unionists and nationalist saw political 
advantage in supporting the government. For the unionists in particular it 
provided an opportunity to demonstrate that their loyalty was not just a 
rhetorical illusion, thus strengthening their case for exclusion of any Home 
Rule settlement. On 1 August, Sir Edward Carson declared that a large body 
of the UVF were willing to provide their services for home defence, with 
many others willing to join the colours to fight wherever required.50 John 
Redmond was more limited in the support forthcoming from the Irish 
Volunteers, telling the House of Commons on 3 August that the 
government ‘may tomorrow withdraw every one of its troops from 
Ireland’.51 In light of the changing mood amongst unionist and nationalist 
politicians, Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was 
able to inform parliament that ‘the one bright spot in the whole of this 
terrible situation is Ireland’.52 
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 Although Ireland had been a fertile source of recruits for the British 
army throughout the 19th Century and the proportion of Irishmen in the 
army had peaked in the 1830s when 43 of serving soldiers were Irish, it had 
fallen back to approximately Ireland’s proportion of the British 
population.53 Nevertheless, in 1914 some 21,000 Irishmen were serving in 
the ranks of the British army, with a further 30,000 reservists subject to 
recall.54 Unlike in other parts of the United Kingdom there was no sense of 
popular enthusiasm in Ireland for the declaration of war, although some 
more aware than others, such as Captain George Berkeley of the Irish 
Volunteers, recognised that war in Europe meant peace at home.55 Even so, 
Ireland, both nationalists and unionist, seemed determined to give the 
departing regiments and reservists a good send-off; even the King’s Own 
Scottish Borders, so recently vilified for the incident at Bachelor’s Walk, 
were given ‘rousing send-off’ as they marched to the docks to embark for 
France.56 The recall of reservists to the colours had an immediate effect on 
both the Irish and Ulster Volunteers, as both depended on former soldiers 
and reservists for instructors. David Fitzpatrick, Professor of Modern 
History at Trinity College Dublin, estimates that of the members of the two 
volunteer movements who would eventually enlist that some 25 per cent 
(7,600) of the Irish Volunteers and fifteen per cent (4,350) of the Ulster 
Volunteers were reservists.57 In Omagh, in a scene that would have been 
unimaginable only weeks before, reservists of the Royal Inniskilling Fusilier 
were given a guard of honour provided by the local units of the Irish 
Volunteers and the UVF, accompanied by the Volunteers’ band and the 
pipe band of a local Orange Lodge.58 
Despite a general belief that the war would be ‘over by Christmas’ on 
7 August Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, 
called for 100,000 volunteers to join the colours, authorising the creation of 
six New Army divisions, including the formation of a division in Ireland to 
be designated the 10th (Irish) Division.59 Analysis of recruitment in Great 
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Britain shows that, the ‘first rush’ to volunteer can be almost precisely dated 
to the period of 25 August to 15 September 1914.60 The upper line in Figure 
1 below shows total recruitment in the United Kingdom for the period 23 
August to 31 October 1914. Ireland’s population in 1914 was approximately 
9 per cent of the total United Kingdom population and the lower dotted 
line in Figure 1 indicates the level of recruitment that would have been 
anticipated from Ireland if enlistment levels similar to rest of the United 
Kingdom had been achieve, while the graph’s solid line shows Ireland’s 
actual recruitment for the period.  
 
 
Figure 1: Daily recruitment in the United Kingdom and Ireland 23 
August to 31 October 1914 (Source: TNA, NATS 1/398). 
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The graph clearly shows ‘the first rush’ to enlist in Great Britain and that no 
similar rush took place in Ireland, indeed only when organised recruitment 
by the UVF commenced in September did Ireland achieve daily levels of 
recruitment equivalent to that of other parts of the United Kingdom.61 
During the first week of the rush to enlist over 63,000 men joined the 
colours throughout the United Kingdom, with recruits from large cities 
making a major contribution to this figure, with London producing 10,334 
recruits, Birmingham 3,516, Glasgow 2,200, Cardiff 1,544 and Liverpool 
1,469. By contrast, during the period only 398 men enlisted in Dublin and 
1,006 in Belfast.62 Consequently when on 5 September the other five New 
Army divisions had exceeded their full complement, the 6th Royal Irish 
Rifles, raised in Belfast and its hinterland, was the only battalion of the 10th 
(Irish) Division at full strength.63 As a result the decision was taken to bring 
the division up to strength with men surplus to the requirements of other 
divisions. Bryan Cooper, the division’s unofficial historian, would later claim 
these drafts were largely men of Irish extraction living in England, there is 
little evidence to support this claim.64  
The declaration of war had an almost immediate effect on the Irish 
economy, particularly in the industrialised north-east. On 6 August 1914 the 
Belfast Evening Telegraph reported the introduction of short time working in 
the linen industry amid fears regarding supplies of flax from Belgium and 
Russia. Even the Belfast shipyards were not exempt from the impact of war, 
when following the departure of skilled workmen for England to hurry the 
completion of warships being built there, pay offs were announced.65 Short 
time working and redundancies had a positive effect on recruitment, as did 
the promise by many employers to continue to give half-pay to the 
dependents of employees who enlisted. 66  By mid-August some 400 
employed in the linen mills of one town alone had enlisted and thus 
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economic, rather than patriotism alone, may have been a major factor in 
higher levels of recruitment in the industrialised north-eastern counties in 
the early months of the war. 67 Such thoughts may have been behind John 
Redmond’s letter to the Secretary State for Ireland when he drew attention 
to differences between the industrial north-east and the more rural counties 
of Ireland:  
 
It must be remembered that the situation of a thickly populated 
manufacturing land and that of a thinly populated agricultural 
country is very different. In England or in manufacturing districts of 
Ulster the dislocation of commerce and industry favours recruiting. 
(…) In agricultural districts, on the other hand, the case is reversed. 
There the work in the fields should be doubled. Already before the 
War more men were required for tillage. Any extensive recruiting in 
country districts at this time would have left a rich harvest rotting.68 
 
While to some extent this is true, comparison of recruitment in Ireland’s 
two largest cities shows that during the period 23 August to 31 October 
1914, the daily average recruitment of 219 in Belfast was more than three 
times that of Dublin.69 
 During the war Irish agriculture benefited not only from increased 
prices but also from increased tillage which rose by over 1.7 million acres 
during the war.70 Even in industrial areas the dislocation of the early weeks 
of the war was short lived. Between July and the end of October 1914 the 
workforce of marine engineers and shipbuilders Harland and Wolff fell 
from 24,425 to 18,412 but during the course of the war the total manpower 
of the Belfast shipyards increased to 37,000.71 The need to produce linen for 
military purposes led to the number employed in the industry increasing 
from 76,000 in 1913 to 90,000 by the end of the war. 72  The war also 
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provided employment opportunities outside Ireland. John Dillon, a 
nationalist MP and recruiting official, complained in 1915 that the 
availability of well-paid jobs in England was making it difficult to obtain 
recruits for the army, particularly when a government agency was offering 
£2 10s a week for munitions workers in a reserved occupation compared 
with the basic shilling a day of an infantry private. 73  According to his 
biographer, Redmond calculated that by the end of 1915 about 40,000 
Irishmen were employed in munitions work in Britain and Ireland.74 
Following a speech by Sir Edward Carson’s to the Ulster Unionist 
Council on 3 September 1914, formal approval was given for members of 
the UVF to enlist. As a result recruitment returns for September 1914 show 
that 12,275 men enlisted in Belfast during the month, with a further 1,469 
men enlisting in other parts of Ulster. These figures however include all 
enlistments in the province not just those from the Ulster Volunteers.75 The 
men of the UVF formed the basis of the 36th (Ulster) Division and during 
the course of the war 31,000 members of the Ulster Volunteers, about one-
third of its peak strength served in the British army. 76  Not everyone, 
however, supported Carson’s decision to encourage members of the UVF 
to enlist. In County Armagh members informed their regimental 
commander that they had ‘signed the covenant to defend Ulster against a 
Dublin parliament and any of our commanders who asks [sic] us to leave 
Ulster or to fight for this notorious government now in office is betraying 
Ulster men and women’.77 
Efforts were also made by nationalist politicians to increase 
recruitment from amongst their supporters. On 20 September John 
Redmond, in a speech at Woodenbridge, County Wicklow, called on the 
Irish Volunteers to service wherever the firing line extends, in defence of 
right, freedom and religion in this war. 78 As Keith Jeffery has observed 
however, Redmond did not make this speech in support of enlistment in 
the British army until after the legislation giving Home Rule to Ireland 
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received Royal Assent.79 Redmond’s speech had a mixed response. Critics 
were quick to allege that Home Rule was Redmond’s reward for ‘the 
promotion of recruiting for the English army in Ireland’.80 Analysis shows 
however, that in the four weeks following Redmond’s speech recruitment 
fell in the three predominately nationalist southern provinces by over 40 per 
cent compared with the previous four weeks.81 Redmond’s speech had a 
greater impact on constitutional nationalism however, as the speech split the 
Irish Volunteers: although the majority remained committed to Redmond 
and Home Rule through political means, a militant minority left the 
organisation taking its name and some of its weapons with them. It was this 
group that formed the nucleus of those involved in the Easter Rising in 
April 1916, when armed militant republicans occupied key buildings in 
Dublin and proclaimed an Irish Republic. Nevertheless, those Irish 
Volunteers who remand loyal to Redmond contributed 32,000 men to the 
British army, many of whom joined the largely nationalist 16th (Irish) 
Division.82  
Even among his supporters Redmond’s call to join the army was 
treated with suspicion. Kitchener’s comments on the possible need for 
conscription led many to believe that Redmond’s support for the war would 
lead to its introduction in Ireland. As a result Redmond spent much of the 
autumn of 1914 denying these rumours despite which, reports of young 
men emigrating to escape conscription persisted. 83 In short, what Keith 
Jeffery described as the belief that ‘worn out politicians’ were duping 
‘misguided Irish youths (…) into taking the “King’s shilling”’, only for them 
to be needlessly ‘slaughtered in France at the altar of British imperialism’ 
was beginning to be observed.84 Few among Redmond’s colleagues in the 
Irish Parliamentary Party shared his commitment to recruitment but rather 
adopted what James McConnel terms the “mental neutrality” which 
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characterized much of nationalist Ireland during the early part of the war’.85 
According to McConnel this mental neutrality is evidenced in that while ‘in 
many parts of nationalist Ireland was sympathetic to Belgium (…) 
nationalist sympathy for Belgium did not automatically translate into active 
support for Britain’.86 
Both unionist and nationalist leaders appealed to the patriotism of 
their constituents, however, both Jeffery and Fitzpatrick have shown that 
motives for enlisting are much more wide-ranging than just patriotism.87 
Analysis shows that regardless of religion or politics Ulster, with 31 per cent 
of available manpower, provided 51 per cent of all enlistments in Ireland 
between the outbreak of war and October 1916, while Munster, with 22.5 
per cent of available manpower, only provided 16.2 per cent of Irish 
enlistments.88 Similarly, although Protestants represented only 25 per cent 
of the population in 1914, they provided 45 per cent of all enlistments in 





While the declaration of war may have saved Ireland from civil war in 1914, 
it left a nation no less divided. Despite the continuing threat of a Home 
Rule parliament, Ulster unionists concluded that ‘however we are treated, 
and however others might act, let us act rightly. We do not seek to purchase 
terms by selling our patriotism’. 90 The Government of Ireland Act 1914 
providing home rule for Ireland was passed by the United Kingdom 
parliament on 18 September 1914 but due to the war its implementation 
was formally postponed for the duration of the war.91 As the war depleted 
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the ranks of the UVF more than its nationalist counterparts, it lessened the 
possibility of a clash between the opposing paramilitary groups.92 Even after 
the Easter Rising there was initially little support for the rebels. However, 
the execution of 14 of the rebel leaders by the British army changed public 
opinion thus increasing the support for more militant nationalist activists.93 
In the 1918 post-war general election Sinn Féin won 73 of the 105 Irish 
seats pledging not to take their seats in the Westminster parliament. On 21 
January 1919 Sinn Féin members met in Dublin to establish an Irish 
parliament. On the same day a number of members of the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) attacked and shot two members of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary thus triggering the start of the Irish War of Independence.94  
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